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INTRODUCTION
A brand-name drug company invests a considerable amount of
money and resources in developing a pioneer drug.  It then success-
fully obtains patents, files with the Food and Drug Administration
† J.D., Cornell Law School, 2014; Ph.D., Chemistry, Washington University in St.
Louis, 2011.  I would like to thank my Note Editors Steve Ma and Stefanie Williams for
their invaluable advice and help; the editors of Volumes 99 and 100 of the Cornell Law
Review for their friendship and excellent editing skills; and, of course, my family and
friends for their love and support.  All errors and omissions are mine.
1227
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-5\CRN505.txt unknown Seq: 2 21-JUL-14 12:20
1228 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:1227
(FDA), and markets the drug.  Later, the company files a patent-in-
fringement lawsuit against a company that tries to market a generic
form of the drug.1  Faced with the prospect of a tedious litigation mar-
athon and the risk of losing its patents, the brand-name company
often settles with the alleged infringer.  Strangely, instead of receiving
any compensation from the alleged infringer, the brand-name drug
manufacturer pays the alleged infringer to stay out of the market until
the patents expire.2  The problem that this presents is far from being
settled: regulatory agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) may challenge such settlements as illegal under the antitrust
laws.3  Now what can the brand-name drug manufacturer do?  Con-
tinue with litigation?  Settle with the alleged infringer and subject
both of them to the antitrust sanction?  Or allow the alleged infringer
to market its generic drug?  None of these options seem appealing,
locking up the company in a predicament.
This oversimplified story depicts what I call the “patentee’s di-
lemma,” which was created after Congress enacted the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, also known as the
Hatch-Waxman Act (HWA).4  Under the HWA, a generic pharmaceu-
tical company can challenge a pioneer manufacturer’s patents on the
brand-name drug by filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA) with the FDA.5
The HWA was enacted with the primary purpose of promoting
generic drugs’ entry into the pharmaceutical market so as to increase
competition and to lower drug prices.6  But Congress did not antici-
pate that the HWA would lead to the creation of “reverse payments.”7
Specifically, the ANDA filing usually triggers a lawsuit brought by the
1 See Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why
Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical
Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57, 60 (2010) (discussing reverse-payment settlements in
which the brand-name drug company [the plaintiff] makes payments to the alleged in-
fringer [the defendant]).
2 Id.
3 See infra Part II (explaining the FTC and DOJ’s position on the issue).
4 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355
(2012)).
5 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (listing the requirements for applicants that seek to chal-
lenge a pioneer manufacturer’s patent).
6 See Jon Leibowitz, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Second Annual In-House
Counsel’s Forum on Pharmaceutical Antitrust: Exclusion Payments to Settle Pharmaceuti-
cal Patent Cases; They’re B-a-a-a-ck! (Apr. 24, 2006) (“When Hatch-Waxman was enacted it
had a few simple goals: ‘to make available more low cost generic drugs by establishing a
generic drug approval procedure . . . .’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647)), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibo
witz/060424PharmaSpeechACI.pdf.
7 Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 87 (stating that the DOJ “assumes that [Con- R
gress’s scheme under the HWA] does not anticipate, and is upset by, the existence of
reverse payments”).
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brand-name drug company against the generic drug company for pat-
ent infringement.8  Contrary to the common understanding of a judi-
cial settlement, where the infringer pays the patentee to end the
lawsuit, the brand-name drug company (the patentee) usually pays a
large amount of money to the generic-brand drug company (the al-
leged infringer) to keep the generic drug out of the market.9  This
practice of settling a patent-infringement lawsuit is called reverse-pay-
ment settlement.  This allows the brand-name drug company to keep
its exclusive monopoly over the patented product.10
The practice of making reverse payments raises antitrust con-
cerns.11  Both consumer groups and the FTC often file antitrust law-
suits against parties that settle in post-HWA litigation.12  These
antitrust lawsuits created a federal circuit split,13 resulting in the Su-
preme Court rendering a decision on the issue in June 2013.14
On the one side, the Sixth Circuit claimed that such reverse pay-
ments are per se illegal.15  Similarly, the Third Circuit decided that
the payments are presumptively illegal unless the defendant can show
that “the payment (1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry or
(2) offers some pro-competitive benefit.”16  The court held that this
presumption of illegality could not be rebutted by proof about the
merits of the patent suit because the reverse payment itself indicated
that the purpose was to delay entry.17
On the other side, the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits
recognized the need to evaluate the strength of the patent, holding
that reverse-payment settlements violate antitrust law only if the settle-
8 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2012) (“It shall be an act of infringement to submit
an application under section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21
U.S.C. § 355(j)] . . . for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a
patent . . . .”).
9 See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 60 (describing reverse-payment settlements as R
settlements in which a payment is made from the patent holder to the alleged infringer).
There can be other types of consideration or side deals as well, such as a nonexclusive
licensing. See id. at 119.
10 See id. at 61 (suggesting side deals between patent holders and ANDA filers have an
anticompetitive effect).
11 Id. at 60–61.
12 Id. at 60.
13 See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 209–15 (3d Cir. 2012) (reviewing
courts’ decisions regarding reverse-payment settlements and indicating the different treat-
ments), vacated sub nom. Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct.
2849 (2013).
14 See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) (holding that reverse-payment
settlements may violate antitrust laws).
15 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 904 (6th Cir. 2003).
16 In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218.
17 Id.
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ment exceeds the exclusionary “‘scope of the patent’s protection.’”18
Unless the patent was a sham or procured by fraud, reverse-payment
settlements were illegal only if the settlement extended the patent mo-
nopoly, such as by “restraining the introduction or marketing of unre-
lated or non-infringing products.”19
The Supreme Court, however, took a middle ground position in
FTC v. Actavis, Inc. With a heated dissent from Chief Justice John Rob-
erts, the majority rejected the scope-of-the-patent test, announcing
that the potential anticompetitive effect of the reverse payment could
not be immune from antitrust law scrutiny.20  The Court adopted a
rule-of-reason analysis, leaving the construction of the analysis open to
the lower courts.21
Reverse payment has also been a popular topic of discussion
among scholars.22  For example, Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis,
and Mark A. Lemley propose that reverse-payment agreements are
presumed illegal unless the brand-name drug company can prove “(1)
that the ex ante likelihood of prevailing in its infringement lawsuit is
significant, and (2) that the size of the payment is no more than the
expected value of litigation and collateral costs attending the law-
suit.”23  In contrast, Daniel Crane proposes that such agreements
should be presumed lawful and that the burden of proving unlawful
conduct should fall on the shoulders of the plaintiff in the antitrust
suit.24  Unsatisfied with both of these approaches, Henry Butler and
Jeffrey Jarosch suggest a rule-of-reason analysis and discuss a list of
factors that a court ought to balance when analyzing the reverse-pay-
ment issue.25  David Opderbeck advocates the importance of market
power in an antitrust analysis and proposes a refined model of a “Set-
tlement Competition Index,” which creates a safe harbor for certain
agreements and sets a threshold for per se illegal violations.26
18 FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d, FTC v.
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544
F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008), abrogated by Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223; In re Tamoxifen
Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted), abrogated by Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223.
19 In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d at 213.
20 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230–31.
21 See id. at 2237.
22 See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 101–14 (introducing different scholarly views). R
23 Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intel-
lectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1759 (2003).
24 See Daniel A. Crane, Ease Over Accuracy in Assessing Patent Settlements: A Response to
Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis, and Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellec-
tual Property Disputes, 88 MINN. L. REV. 698, 709 (2003) [hereinafter Crane, Ease Over
Accuracy].
25 See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 114–18. R
26 See David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment Settlements in
Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1303, 1328–35 (2010).
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After the Actavis opinion, commentators believe that the Court
has taken an antitrust-centric approach, brushing away the issue of
patent validity.27  Some commentators go even further, interpreting
the opinion as announcing a de facto presumptive illegality rule.28
In this Note, I analyze the current debates on the reverse-pay-
ment issue and ultimately reject the de facto illegality presumption.
In light of Actavis, this Note proposes a solution to the predicament
that parties face in reverse-payment settlements.  The proposed model
is distilled from the aforementioned judicial decisions, academic de-
bates, and recent developments in antitrust analysis on tying arrange-
ments.  Under the proposed model, an antitrust plaintiff challenging
a reverse-payment settlement needs to prove three factors to establish
an affirmative case of anticompetitive harm: (1) the patent holder has
strong market power; (2) the settlement amount or other considera-
tions are not justified; and (3) the potential enforceability of the pat-
ent is low.29  If a plaintiff meets this burden, a court should then
weigh the procompetitive benefits of the settlement against its an-
ticompetitive harm.  Even if lower courts read Actavis as not requiring
plaintiffs to prove lack of patent enforceability, they should allow the
antitrust defendants to offer patent strength as a justification for the
payment.30  Part I of this Note introduces the background of the HWA
and reverse-payment settlements.  Part II analyzes the circuit split and
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Actavis.  Part III summarizes some
scholarly debates and proposals.  Part IV proposes a model to analyze
the issue based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis.
I
BACKGROUND OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
Congress enacted the HWA: “(1) to reduce the average price paid
by consumers; (2) [to] preserve the technologies pioneered by the
brand-name pharmaceutical companies; and (3) [to] create an abbre-
viated new drug application (‘ANDA’) to bring generic drugs to the
market.”31  The HWA was designed to strike a balance between en-
couraging innovation by pioneers and promoting competition by the
generic followers.32  However, its special procedural settings have cre-
ated particular settlements between brand-name drug companies and
generic-brand challengers in patent litigation where the brand-name
27 See, e.g., Aaron Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, 28 ANTITRUST 16, 16–17, 19 (2013).
28 See Thomas F. Cotter, FTC v. Actavis, Inc.: When is the Rule of Reason not the Rule of
Reason?, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 41, 42–43 (2014).
29 See infra Part IV.
30 See infra Part IV.
31 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005).
32 C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1560 (2006).
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drug manufacturers may keep their monopolistic market status by pay-
ing the generic-brand drug companies to stay out of the market.33  As
a result, drug prices remains at “supracompetitive” levels, and con-
sumers do not get the benefit of lower prices, raising antitrust
concerns.34
Under the HWA, the pioneer pharmaceutical company that first
launches a prescription drug must obtain FDA approval.35  In order to
do so, it must submit a New Drug Application (NDA) that includes
details of efficacy and safety from studies.36  These clinical studies may
take a long time and are very costly for pharmaceutical companies.37
After approving the application, the FDA publishes the drug’s patent
information in its famous Orange Book.38  The HWA gives NDA filers
certain nonpatent exclusivities, one of which is the New Chemical En-
tity (NCE) exclusivity,39 which bars a generic drug company from fil-
ing an application for approval of a generic drug until five years after
the first approval of the relevant NDA.40
The HWA allows a generic pharmaceutical company to file an
ANDA without conducting clinical trials.41  The company only needs
to prove bioequivalence between the generic drug and the brand-
name drug.42  The FDA also requires the generic pharmaceutical
company filing an ANDA to certify:
(I) that such patent information has not been filed,
(II) that such patent has expired,
(III) of the date on which such patent will expire, or
(IV) that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the man-
ufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is
submitted . . . .43
Most of the reverse-payment cases involve filers who certify that
the patent is not valid or not infringed upon, known as a Paragraph IV
certification.44  A generic drug company may file an ANDA with a Par-
33 This process is also known as “pay-for-delay.” Id. at 1557.
34 Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV.
283, 288 (2012).
35 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012).
36 Id. § 355(b)(1).
37 For a general discussion about the cost of developing new drugs, see Avik Roy, How
the FDA Stifles New Cures, Part I: The Rising Cost of Clinical Trials, FORBES APOTHECARY BLOG
(Apr. 24, 2012, 5:19PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2012/04/24/how-the-fda-sti
fles-new-cures-part-i-the-rising-cost-of-clinical-trials/.
38 Stephanie Greene, A Prescription for Change: How the Medicare Act Revises Hatch-
Waxman to Speed Market Entry of Generic Drugs, 30 J. CORP. L. 309, 316–17 (2005).
39 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii), (j)(5)(F)(ii).
40 One exception is Paragraph IV filers, who are barred for only four years. Id.
41 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005).
42 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(3)(D)(i).
43 Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
44 See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
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agraph IV certification four years after the first NDA approval, despite
the five-year bar provided by the NCE exclusivity discussed above.45
Under the HWA, this ANDA filing with a Paragraph IV certifica-
tion constitutes constructive patent infringement, even if the generic
drug has not been marketed for sale.46  The filer must also notify the
patent holder, the brand-name manufacturer, who will usually bring a
patent-infringement lawsuit against the ANDA filer.47  If the patent
owner does not bring the lawsuit against the ANDA filer within forty-
five days, the FDA can approve the ANDA without further delay.48  If,
however, the patent owner brings the lawsuit, the ANDA is automati-
cally stayed for either thirty months or until a district court renders a
decision regarding the validity of the patent.49
The HWA awards the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer a 180-day
exclusive-entry period, making the market a duopoly of the first
ANDA filer and the brand-name drug company.50  However, subse-
quent ANDA filers cannot enjoy an equivalent 180-day exclusive-entry
period, an effect known as the “bottleneck” effect of approval.51  This
45 Id. This provision also creates the possibility of multiple “first filers” on the four-
year anniversary of FDA approval of an NDA subject to New Chemical Entity exclusivity.
See infra note 50. R
46 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2012).
47 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iii).
48 Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
49 Id.
50 Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Hemphill, supra note 32, at 1560.  In fact, “duopoly” may not R
be an accurate word under certain situations.  The term “first ANDA filer” refers to all of
the applicants who submit substantially complete ANDAs with Paragraph IV certifications
on the same day that is earlier than any other ANDA filing. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb).  Multiple ANDA applicants may hold exclusivity concurrently
on the same drug if they each apply on the same day and file Paragraph IV certifications
concerning at least one of the Orange Book–listed patents for that drug.  This most com-
monly occurs when multiple applicants file ANDAs on the four-year anniversary of FDA
approval of an NDA subject to the NCE exclusivity. See id. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii), (j)(5)(F)(ii)
(allowing actions to commence beginning forty-eight months after the approval date of an
application filed under § 355); see also FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2246 (2013)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[A]ccording to the Food and Drug Administration, all manu-
facturers who file on the first day are considered ‘first applicants’ who share the exclusivity
period.”).
51 When the HWA was originally enacted, it provided two triggers for the 180 days of
exclusivity: (1) the ANDA first-filer beginning marketing of its generic drug or (2) a court
declaring the patent on the brand-name drug invalid or not infringed.  The FDA condi-
tioned the second trigger on the ANDA filer successfully defending against the patent
infringement suit.  Therefore, as long as the ANDA filer reached an agreement with the
patent holder, the 180 days of exclusivity would never be triggered.  However, after the
D.C. Circuit’s 1998 decision in Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.2d 1060, 1069–70
(D.C. Cir. 1998), and the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act, the HWA was modified to
include a use-it-or-lose-it provision that requires the first ANDA filer to take 180 days of
exclusivity before a certain triggering deadline.  Otherwise, such exclusivity will be for-
feited. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D) (including a forfeiture provision intended to promote
more generic entry).  For a detailed discussion, see Erica N. Andersen, Note, Schering the
Market: Analyzing the Debate Over Reverse-Payment Settlements in the Wake of the Medicare Moderni-
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lucrative 180 days becomes the main incentive for a generic drug com-
pany to be the first to challenge a brand-name drug company’s
patent.52
In general, the brand-name drug company will then file a patent-
infringement lawsuit against the Paragraph IV filer to litigate the pat-
ent’s validity.53  During the patent litigation, the brand-name com-
pany may elect to settle with the challenging generic drug company,
offering it more money than it would make during the 180-day exclu-
sive period, inducing the challenger to drop the ANDA filing and
keeping the patent intact.54  Subsequent generic drug companies
would not have the benefit of the 180-day exclusive period and would
not be approved for entry into the market.55  After the 180-day exclu-
sive period, subsequent sellers will lack the incentive to file an ANDA
because the potential costs associated with a patent-infringement suit
outweigh the low profit margins and the consequently low settlement
amount.56  Both the brand-name company and the first ANDA filer
benefit from settling the suit; subsequent ANDA filers will be blocked
by the bottleneck and discouraged from entering the market for the
particular drug, allowing the brand-name company to continue charg-
ing monopoly prices for its drug.57
Another form of implicit compensation for delay is licensing,
where the brand-name companies grant licenses to the generic com-
panies to launch authorized generic drugs.  As a result of nonexclu-
sive licensing, the patent remains intact and the generic drug
company is compensated through sales of the authorized generic
drugs.58
zation Act of 2003 and In re Tamoxifen Citrate Litigation, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1021–24
(2008) (indicating that the FTC argued for the potential abuse of the amended Hatch-
Waxman provision).
52 David A. Balto, We’ll Sell Generics, Too: Innovator Drug Makers Are Gaming the Regula-
tory System and Harming Competition, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 20, 2006, at 39.
53 See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text. R
54 For a general discussion, see Yuki Onoe, Note, “Pay-For-Delay” Settlements in Pharma-
ceutical Litigation: Drawing a Fine Line Between Patent Zone and Antitrust Zone, 9 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 527, 530 (2009) (discussing the context and incentives for the “pay-
for-delay” settlement and its predicament under antitrust scrutiny).
55 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
56 Scott Bergeson, Note, A Vaccine Approach to the Reverse Payment Illness, 18 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 26–30 (2012) (arguing that Congress should amend the HWA to allow the 180
days of exclusivity to transfer to subsequent filers to provide more incentives for the subse-
quent filers).
57 See id. at 15, 23 (discussing the resulting bottleneck effect on competition).
58 See BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM’N, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT,
AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2010, at 1
(2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/agree
ments-filed-federal-trade-commission-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement-
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The agreement between the brand-name company and the ge-
neric company give rise to antitrust concerns.59  Any settlement agree-
ment must be submitted to the FTC, although prior clearance is not
required.60  The FTC and Department of Justice (DOJ) have joined
together to argue that these reverse payments are illegal agreements
between competitors.61  However, some federal circuit courts do not
endorse the FTC and DOJ’s challenge to these settlement agree-
ments.62  The disagreement among circuits led the Supreme Court to
consider the issue of reverse-payment settlements in FTC v. Actavis,
Inc.63  Part II of this Note will discuss the conflict among the federal
circuit courts and the Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis.
II
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND ACTAVIS
Before Actavis, the decisions addressing reverse-payment settle-
ments were quite polarized among the federal circuits.  The Sixth Cir-
cuit once ruled that reverse-payment settlement agreements were per
se illegal,64 and the Third Circuit, adopting the FTC and DOJ’s ap-
proach, held that reverse-payment settlements were presumptively ille-
gal, subject to limited exceptions.65  In contrast, the Second, Eleventh,
and Federal Circuits adopted the “scope of the patent” test,66 which
states that reverse-payment settlements violate antitrust laws only if the
settlements exceed the exclusionary scope of the patent.67
In Actavis, the Supreme Court rejected the scope-of-the-patent
test.68  The Court held that the fact that a reverse-payment settlement
agreement’s anticompetitive effects fell within the patent’s scope did
not immunize the agreement from antitrust attack.69  At the same
time, the Supreme Court refused to embrace the “quick look” ap-
and/1105mmaagreements.pdf  (showing that certain settlements were reached as implicit
compensation).
59 Cory J. Ingle, Reverse Payment Settlements: A Patent Approach to Defending the Argument
for Illegality, 7 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 503, 504 (2012).
60 21 U.S.C. § 355 note.
61 Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 61. R
62 See infra Part II.
63 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
64 See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 907–08 (6th Cir. 2003).
65 See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom.
Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849, 2849 (2013); Butler &
Jarosch, supra note 1, at 60. R
66 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2006), abro-
gated by Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223; Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075–76
(11th Cir. 2005); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323,
1335–37 (Fed. Cir. 2008), abrogated by Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223.
67 FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d, Actavis, 133
S. Ct. 2223; Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1065–66, 1075–76.
68 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231.
69 See id. at 2232.
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proach advocated by the FTC, which would have had the effect of
holding reverse-payment settlements presumptively unlawful.70
Rather, the Court adopted a rule-of-reason analysis, which will be dis-
cussed below.71
A. The Circuit Split Before Actavis
In In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., the Sixth Circuit ruled that a
payment-for-delay agreement was per se illegal.72  The ANDA filer
(Andrx) agreed with the brand-name company (HMR) to refrain
from marketing its generic drug in exchange for a quarterly payment
of ten million dollars, despite the FDA’s approval of the generic
drug.73  Andrx also retained the exclusivity period once the patent
litigation between Andrx and HMR terminated.74  The court ruled
that the agreement “was, at its core, a horizontal agreement to elimi-
nate competition in the market.”75  Similarly, in In re K-Dur Antitrust
Litigation, the Third Circuit adopted a quick look method, analyzing
“any payment from a patent holder to a generic patent challenger
who agrees to delay entry into the market as prima facie evidence of an
unreasonable restraint of trade.”76  The court agreed with the FTC
and ruled that there was no need to consider the merits of the patent
suit because “the quid pro quo for the payment was an agreement by
the generic to defer entry beyond the date that represents an other-
wise reasonable litigation compromise.”77
These cases set a very high level of judicial scrutiny of parties that
settle with reverse payments, while overlooking an important aspect of
70 See id. at 2237.
71 See id.
72 See 332 F.3d 896, 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
73 Id. at 902–03.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 908.  This is no longer an issue under the current amendment to the Hatch-
Waxman Act, however, because under the amendment, a generic company would forfeit
the 180-day exclusive award. See supra discussion accompanying note 51. R
76 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. La.
Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013).
77 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The FTC and DOJ advocated for a similar
approach: reverse payments should be illegal unless the defendant could propose procom-
petitive effects for the payments.  See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 61.  More specifi- R
cally, the DOJ would presume that such payments were unlawful unless the defendant
could show “either that (1) the reverse payment amount was ‘not greatly in excess of
avoided litigation costs’ or (2) the settlement exclusion period did not exceed the ex-
pected litigation exclusion period, given the settlors’ contemporaneous estimates of the
likelihood that the patent holder would have won the patent litigation.”  Elhauge & Krue-
ger, supra note 34, at 287 (quoting Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s R
Invitation at 10, 22, 28–32, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d
98 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 05-2851-cv(L), 05-2852-cv (CON), 05-2863-cv (CON)), 2009 WL
8385027, at *10, *22, *28–32) (emphasis omitted).
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patent law: its monopolistic nature.78  Such decisions force the patent
holder either to secure the validity of the patent through litigation or
allow the alleged infringer to market the generics.79  While weeding
out weak patents, the approach to reverse-payment settlements dis-
cussed above may burden pioneer brand-name companies and may
discourage innovation in the long run.80
On the opposite end of the spectrum was the “scope of the pat-
ent” test.  In In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., two parties settled
Hatch-Waxman litigation in which the patent was declared invalid by
the district court and the case was pending appeal.81  The ANDA filer
agreed to change its Paragraph IV certificate to a Paragraph III certifi-
cate in return for a nonexclusive license and a payment of more than
forty million dollars from the brand-name drug company.82  The Sec-
ond Circuit assumed the legality of the settlement, rejecting the argu-
ment that reverse-payment settlements are inherently anticompetitive.
The court recognized that “the patent holder [was] seeking to arrive
at a settlement in order to protect that to which it is presumably enti-
tled: a lawful monopoly over the manufacture and distribution of the
patented product.”83  Therefore, the anticompetitive effect of the set-
tlement was acceptable unless the terms of the settlement enlarged
the monopoly’s scope.84
As a result of the scope-of-the-patent test,85 courts have paid more
deference to the patent scope and have allowed some blatantly an-
78 See Shannon U. Han, Note, Pay-to-Delay Settlements: The Circuit-Splitting Headache
Plaguing Big Pharma, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 913, 924 (2013) (“The court reasoned
that ‘[b]y their nature, patents create an environment of exclusion, and consequently,
cripple competition,’ and therefore the anticompetitive nature is present by force of law.”
(quoting Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065–66 (11th Cir. 2005))).
79 See Meredith Bateman, Note, In Re K-Dur Litigation—Reverse Payments: Against
Prices, Purchasers, and Policy, 15 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 293, 302 (2012) (stating that
critics “will likely assert that the holding is contrary to policy considerations favoring settle-
ment over litigation”).
80 See Han, supra note 78, at 938 (“Though commentators have argued that these R
settlements could ultimately have some competitive benefits by allowing earlier entry into
the market, the standard does not call for an understanding of countervailing procompeti-
tive effects.”).
81 See 466 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2223 (2013).
82 Id. at 193–94.
83 Id. at 208–09.
84 Id at 208.
85 In In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., the court differentiated Ciproflox-
acin from In re Cardizem, in which case the agreement exceeded the exclusionary zone of
the disputed patent because the generic drug company agreed not to market the nonin-
fringing drug so as to delay the entry of other generic drugs.  544 F.3d 1323, 1335–36 (Fed.
Cir. 2008), abrogated by Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223.  In Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, the court
adopted a three-part test to determine if antitrust analysis was appropriate, examining: (1)
the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the agree-
ments exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects.  402 F.3d 1056,
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ticompetitive reverse-payment agreements that fell within the patent’s
scope.86
B. The Middle Ground: The Supreme Court’s Rule-of-Reason
Approach in Actavis
The Supreme Court appears to settle the issue of reverse pay-
ments in Actavis.  In this case, after the FDA’s approval of an ANDA
filing, the ANDA filers (Watson and Par/Paddock) reached an agree-
ment with the brand-name drug company (Solvay) where Solvay
would pay Par/Paddock ten million dollars per year for six years and
an additional two million dollars per year for backup manufacturing
assistance.87  In addition, Solvay would share some profits of the
brand-name drug with Watson through September 2015.88  In return,
Watson and Par/Paddock agreed to delay marketing the generic
products until August 31, 2015, and to promote the brand-name drug
to healthcare professionals and urologists.89  The parties stipulated to
dismiss the pending patent infringement litigation, which involved a
patent that expires in August 2020.90  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the district court’s dismissal of the FTC’s complaint, rejecting the
FTC’s argument that it had sufficiently stated an antitrust claim.91
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision by
first rejecting the notion that reverse-payment settlements falling
within the scope of the patent’s exclusionary power are immune from
antitrust scrutiny.92  After the Court summarized controlling law,
holding that patent-related settlement agreements can sometimes vio-
late the antitrust laws, the Court noted five sets of considerations that
the FTC should have been allowed to prove its antitrust claim:93 First,
“the specific restraint at issue has the potential for genuine adverse
effects on competition.”94  Second, “these anticompetitive conse-
1066 (11th Cir. 2005).  Under this test, as long as the reverse payment did not pertain to
products outside the patent’s exclusionary scope, such payment would often not be consid-
ered anticompetitive. Id. at 1067.
86 See Michael A. Carrier, Why the “Scope of the Patent” Test Cannot Solve the Drug Patent
Settlement Problem, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 8 (2012) [hereinafter Carrier, Why the “Scope of
the Patent” Test].  For further critiques on the scope-of-the-patent test, see id. at 5–8.
87 FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1303–05 (3d Cir. 2012), rev’d, Actavis,
133 S. Ct. 2223.
88 Id. at 1305.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 1303–05.
91 Id. at 1312.
92 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230.
93 Id. at 2234–37. But see id. at 2241 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that each of
the cited precedents “stands for the same, uncontroversial point: that when a patent holder
acts outside the scope of its patent, it is no longer protected from antitrust scrutiny by the
patent”).
94 Id. at 2234 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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quences will at least sometimes prove unjustified.”95  Third, “where a
reverse payment threatens to work unjustified anticompetitive harm,
the patentee likely possesses the power to bring that harm about in
practice.”96  Fourth, “an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasi-
ble administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed.”97  Fifth, “the
fact that a large, unjustified reverse payment risks antitrust liability
does not prevent litigating parties from settling their lawsuit.”98
Although the Court identified these five issues, it rejected the
FTC’s quick look approach and adopted a rule-of-reason analysis.99
Quoting California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, a case that discussed the quick
look approach, the Court concluded that the quick look approach was
not appropriate in the reverse-payment-settlement context.  Rather, it
was only appropriate when “an observer with even a rudimentary un-
derstanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in
question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and
markets.”100
However, the Court gave little guidance on how lower courts
should apply the rule of reason.101  While this gave the lower courts
flexibility on how to conduct the rule-of-reason analysis, as the dissent-
ing opinion sarcastically pointed out, the lack of detailed instruction
amounted to little more than wishing the lower courts “[g]ood luck”
in analyzing the issues that arise with reverse-payment settlements
under the rule of reason.102
III
SCHOLARLY VIEWS ON REVERSE-PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
The Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis has settled the debate to
some extent.  However, some of the concerns and analyses in the fol-
lowing scholarly works will be helpful in constructing a rule-of-reason
analysis post-Actavis.  The theories discussed in this Part are among
95 Id. at 2235–36.
96 Id. at 2236.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 2237.
99 Id.
100 Id. (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
101 See id. at 2238.
102 Id. at 2245 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Good luck to the district courts that must,
when faced with a patent settlement, weigh the ‘likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming
virtues, market power, and potentially offsetting legal considerations present in the circum-
stances.’” (quoting id. at 2231 (majority opinion))).
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the most influential analyses103 found in rich legal treatises that have
considered the reverse-payment settlement issue.104
Scholars who considered reverse payments prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Actavis disagreed sharply on the proper approach.
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley suggest that reverse payments should
be treated as presumptively unlawful.105  On the other end of the
spectrum, Daniel Crane has argued that reverse-payment settlements
should be permitted when the ex ante probability of patent validity is
high but not when it is low.106  He also argues that the burden of
proof should not be placed on the settling parties.107  In contrast to
both of the approaches above, Butler and Jarosch argue that since
reverse payments are not anticompetitive in nature, the rule-of-reason
approach is more appropriate because it balances multiple factors on
a case-by-case basis.108  Alternatively, Opderbeck proposes a quantita-
103 Commentators have discussed extensively about the reverse-payment issue.  Some
are not satisfied with courts’ undue deference to the exclusivity power of patent law, claim-
ing that at least some reverse-payment settlements in Hatch-Waxman cases should be pre-
sumed illegal. See Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, supra note 23, at 1759.  Some criticize the R
scope-of-the-patent test as incompetent to solve the reverse settlement problem because
the test assumes the validity of the patent and is inapplicable to the infringement issue. See
Carrier, Why the “Scope of the Patent” Test, supra note 86, at 6–7.  On the other hand, many R
commentators also defend reverse payments. See Joe Mullin, Reversal of Fortune?, IP L. &
BUS., Oct./Nov. 2009, at 34 (listing the names of several attorneys who represent pharma-
ceutical companies and who favor reverse-payment settlement agreements); Marc G.
Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J.
1033, 1033–35 (2004) (arguing that reverse payments are not always anticompetitive and
may have positive features).  For example, one theory treats such payments as insurance
paid to avoid the uncertainty of litigation. Cf. Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289
F. Supp. 2d 986, 993 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“It is not ‘bad faith’ to assert patent rights that one is
not certain will be upheld in a suit for infringement pressed to judgment and to settle the
suit to avoid risking the loss of the rights.” (citation omitted)).  Others have also proposed
novel treatments to the issue; for example, instead of using antitrust analysis, courts could
use the patent law doctrine of patent misuse to determine the illegality of the reverse
payment. See Ingle, supra note 59, at 503. R
104 Of course, although this Note’s framework is not based on them, there are many
other influential treatises. See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PHARMACEUTICAL IN-
DUSTRY ANTITRUST HANDBOOK (2009).
105 See Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, supra note 23, at 1759.  Other scholars have advo- R
cated similar views of presumed illegality with different rebuttal grounds.  For a detailed
discussion, see Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presump-
tive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 77 (2009) (allowing rebuttal based on information asym-
metries); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 408
(2003) (proposing presumed illegality rebutted by proof of varying party estimates or risk
aversion).
106 Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust
Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747, 779–96 (2002) [hereinafter Crane, Exit
Payments].
107 Crane, Ease Over Accuracy, supra note 24, at 709 (placing the burden of persuasion R
on the settling parties, however, would chill patent infringement settlements by making
them presumptively illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act).
108 See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 113 (indicating that the empirical data did not R
prove anticompetitive effect of reverse payments and that economic analysis shows both
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tive measurement involving a determination of market concentration
and the probability of the patent’s enforcement.109
After the Actavis decision, many scholars believe that a full-scale
analysis under the rule of reason is not necessary.110  These scholars
have read Justice Stephen Breyer’s majority opinion in Actavis to pre-
sume that the brand-name drug company has market power.111  One
scholar, Thomas Cotter, has gone further, arguing that under the ma-
jority’s holding, the rule-of-reason standard is functionally no differ-
ent from the presumptive illegality standard.112
A. Presumptively Unlawful
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley suggest that reverse payments
should be treated as presumptively unlawful.113  According to their
analysis, in cases where an agreement itself looks like it would fall
under an antitrust per se rule but for the presence of intellectual
property rights, the traditional rule-of-reason analysis is not appropri-
ate.114  Specifically, cases challenging reverse-payment settlements
center around the validity of the patent and the reasonableness of the
settlement, whereas the rule-of-reason analysis assesses whether a prac-
tice tends to diminish market-wide output.115  Therefore,
Hovenkamp, Janis and Lemley argue, these cases should be decided
on intellectual property grounds and not subjected to antitrust scru-
tiny if it can be shown that “the patent in question is valid and
infringed.”116
These scholars also argue that there are two components to a re-
verse payment: “the cost of continued litigation” and “the value of
eliminating competition that the patentee could not expect ex ante to
exclude after trial.”117  They argue that while it may be rational for a
patent holder to enter a reverse-payment settlement to lower litigation
costs, reverse payments are clearly anticompetitive because they per-
mit patent holders to exclude potential rivals from the market.118  To
address these two components, they propose that a reverse payment
should be presumed unlawful unless the plaintiff can prove “(1) that
anticompetitive and procompetitive effect). But see Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, supra
note 23, at 1724 (rejecting a rule-of-reason analysis). R
109 Opderbeck, supra note 26, at 1325–29. R
110 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the Supreme Court’s
Actavis Decision, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 3, 6 (2014).
111 See id. at 6, 23–24.
112 Cotter, supra note 28, at 43–46. R
113 Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, supra note 23, at 1759. R
114 Id. at 1724.
115 Id. at 1724–25.
116 See id. at 1725.
117 Id. at 1758.
118 Id. at 1758–59.
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the ex ante likelihood of prevailing in its infringement lawsuit is sig-
nificant, and (2) that the size of the payment is no more than the
expected value of litigation and collateral costs attending the
lawsuit.”119
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley posit that such “a harsh rule will
not necessarily impede settlement[,]” as settlements can take other
forms such as licensing.120  Another alternative is a settlement of
delayed entry without reverse payments.121  They also argue that this
rule will not “reduce the legitimate value of pharmaceutical patent
rights” because the legitimate exclusion value of a pharmaceutical pat-
ent is a function of the scope of the patent and its chance of being
held valid.122  The patent rights do not immunize from antitrust scru-
tiny reverse payments that seek to exclude potential competitors.123
B. Presumptively Lawful
Realizing that the presumption of illegality is harsh on antitrust
defendants and would “unduly chill patent infringement settle-
ments,”124 Daniel Crane proposes a standard that places the “burden
of persuasion” on the antitrust plaintiff to prove the defendants’ un-
lawful conduct.125  He also emphasizes the potential validity of the pat-
ent at issue: an “optimal rule would permit exit payment settlements
when the ex ante likelihood of success of the patentee’s infringement
suit is high and prohibit them when the ex ante probability of success is
low.”126  If the patent holder can present evidence that it would likely
succeed at the infringement trial, then the size of the payment should
not trigger antitrust concerns.127
Crane also proposes four methods to distinguish between cases
that are free from antitrust scrutiny and those where heightened scru-
tiny is warranted: First, if the patent holder received a preliminary in-
junction against the alleged infringer, then the patent holder is likely
to win its case on the merits.128  Second, if a preliminary injunction
issue was not litigated, then a court could conduct a “quick look” at
119 Id. at 1759.
120 Id. at 1760.  Notice, however, that in the same article, the authors also suggest that
courts look into the merit of the settlement and caution that parties may conceal those
payments by turning them into non-cash compensation. See id. at 1760, 1763.
121 Id. at 1762.
122 Id. at 1761–62.
123 Id.
124 Crane, Ease Over Accuracy, supra note 24, at 709. R
125 Id. (emphasis omitted).
126 Crane, Exit Payments, supra note 106, at 750. R
127 Cf. Crane, Ease Over Accuracy, supra note 24, at 710–11 (“[T]he strength of the pat- R
ent infringement suit, not the monetary structure of the settlement, determines whether
the settlement is socially beneficial or costly.”).
128 See Crane, Exit Payments, supra note 106, at 783–85. R
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the merits of the patent-infringement suit to determine whether or
not to allow the settlement.129  Third, if a patent holder pays a large
proportion of its monopoly rents to the alleged infringer, then the
settlement is suspicious, indicating either a low probability that the
patent is valid or that the defendant’s use actually infringes the pat-
ent.130  Fourth, courts can look at which parties are affected by the
reverse payment.131  For instance, if the settlement blocked a third
party from entering the market, it could be anticompetitive.132
C. Full-Scale Rule of Reason
Realizing that the presumptive illegality rule can be an overdeter-
rent, Butler and Jarosch argue for a rule-of-reason analysis.133  Such
an approach could minimize errors that occur when a per se or quick
look rule is applied, specifically when challengers to reverse-payment
settlements falsely accuse an activity that is procompetitive or antitrust
neutral.134  The authors argue that in order to apply, both per se and
quick look rules require an obviously anticompetitive agreement type,
which reverse payments lack.135  Instead, reverse payments are context
specific and can be better analyzed under the rule of reason.136  There
are multiple policy concerns and economic incentives behind a
reverse-payment settlement, and empirically, such a settlement can be
procompetitive.137
To operationalize the rule-of-reason analysis, Butler and Jarosch
propose six factors that courts should examine: (1) market power—if
a brand-name drug does not have market power in its targeted mar-
ket, the reverse payment will not harm consumers and will not be an-
ticompetitive;138 (2) the entrance date allowed by the reverse-payment
settlement—“[i]f the negotiated entry date is significantly before the
date that the patent will expire, the agreement is not likely to be
anticompetitive”;139 (3) the relative size of the reverse payment—
while a large payment is problematic and potentially signals an agree-
ment not to compete, it can also demonstrate the patent holder’s ex-
treme risk-aversion activities;140 (4) the ANDA filer’s ability to market
129 Id. at 785.
130 See id at 788.
131 See id. at 792.
132 Id.
133 See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 61–62. R
134 See id. at 120–21 (noting the Type I error that would result from the DOJ’s per se
rule).
135 Id. at 85–86.
136 Id. at 86.
137 See id. at 94–100, 112–13.
138 Id. at 116.
139 Id.
140 See id. at 117–18.
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the drug without a reverse payment—a showing that the generic com-
pany lacks marketing ability may indicate that the payment has no an-
ticompetitive effect;141 (5) sham litigation—nonmeritorious litigation
strongly indicates anticompetitive effects;142 and (6) suspicious side
deals—“[i]nequitable or severely unbalanced side deals suggest a pay-
ment for delay” and can be anticompetitive.143
This rule-of-reason analysis, which extensively reviews the reverse-
payment issue, may overanalyze certain cases where agreements are
clearly not anticompetitive.  Therefore, this approach may be too
cumbersome for lower courts to carry out on a case-by-case basis.144
D. “Settlement Competition Index” Analysis
Acknowledging that previous models might overdeter potentially
beneficial settlements or underdeter deleterious settlements, David
Opderbeck proposes a more quantitative and easier-to-operate model
to analyze the issue, the Settlement Competition Index (SCI).145  This
index is essentially a refinement of Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley’s
theory.146  Using empirical data and a mathematical model, it creates
three zones of antitrust scrutiny: the safety zone with no antitrust lia-
bility; the per se illegal zone, and a zone in between, which requires a
rule-of-reason analysis.147
Opderbeck essentially uses two criteria to compute the SCI:
“(1) [t]he difference in product market concentration that would
likely result from the agreement; and (2) [t]he probability that the
patent will be held to be valid and infringed.”148  The SCI was partly
derived from the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which mea-
sures market concentrations before and after generic entry.149  SCI
equals the change in HHI divided by the probability of a patent
enforcement.150
141 Id. at 118.
142 See id.
143 Id. at 119.
144 For examples of contexts in which a reverse-payment settlement may be clearly
anticompetitive, see Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, supra note 23, at 1763.  Chief Justice R
Roberts also strongly opposed the rule-of-reason analysis in his dissenting opinion to the
Actavis case. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2245 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
145 See Opderbeck, supra note 26, at 1305. R
146 Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley argue that courts should treat reverse payments
that are greater than litigation costs as presumptively illegal.  See Hovenkamp, Janis & Lem-
ley, supra note 23, at 1720.  Opderbeck offers a “more refined inquiry into the actual an- R
ticompetitive effects” of these payments by considering market power.  Opderbeck, supra
note 26, at 1323. R
147 See Opderbeck, supra note 26, at 1305. R
148 Id. at 1328–29.
149 See id. at 1329.
150 Id.
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Opderbeck argues that previous approaches overlooked or over-
simplified the influence of market power.151  “Only in the context of
per se liability, where the conduct is deemed inherently anticompeti-
tive, is the question of market definition set aside . . . .  [H]owever,
[the authorities in reverse-payment settlements] do not explain why
such agreements are inherently anticompetitive . . . .”152  The differ-
ence in the patented product’s market-power concentration is prop-
erly reflected in the change in HHI, consistent with the DOJ-FTC
intellectual property licensing and merger guidelines.153
The second important aspect of the model is the probability of
patent enforcement, which is, in effect, an assessment of the patent’s
scope.154  Opderbeck argues that a capable expert could offer an
opinion about the probability of patent enforcement, allowing a fed-
eral court to evaluate properly the merits of the underlying litigation
or settlement.155
Under Opderbeck’s model, then, a settlement that yields high
market concentration with a low probability of patent enforcement,
meaning that the SCI number is high, is per se illegal.156  Conversely,
a low SCI number creates a safe harbor for a settlement, which occurs
when the market concentration, taking the settlement into account, is
low and the probability of patent enforcement is high.157  Any settle-
ments with SCI numbers falling between these two critical levels will
be subject to heightened scrutiny, where the court or regulatory
agency would inquire into a variety of factors under the rule of
reason.158
E. Readings of Actavis
The Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis inevitably preempted
some scholarly views, but it also adopted certain insights from the
aforementioned approaches.159  Moreover, post-Actavis, these schol-
151 Id. at 1329 n.208 (“[M]ost economists who have attempted to model responses to
the reverse payment settlement problem define a relevant product market[ ] but oversim-
plify their models by assuming the market is either a monopoly or duopoly.”); id. at 1330
(suggesting that the scope of a patent should be considered in addition to a patent
holder’s market power).
152 Id. at 1330.
153 See id. at 1329, 1333.
154 Id. at 1336.
155 Id. at 1337–39 (noting also that similar to class action cases and bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, a federal court could properly evaluate the merits of the underlying litigation or
settlement).
156 See id. at 1329, 1346.
157 See id.
158 See id. at 1346.
159 See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013) (citing the academic work
of Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, two antitrust scholars).
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ars’ works can still influence how lower courts will conduct their rule-
of-reason analyses.160
One way of reading the Court’s opinion is that the lower courts
do not need to launch a full scale rule-of-reason analysis161 because
“the size of the payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a pro-
spective generic is itself a strong indicator of power.”162  Moreover,
competitive harm could be inferred from a large payment where con-
vincing justifications are absent.163  While Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemp-
hill, Herbert Hovenkamp, and Carl Shapiro propose several
justifications for a significant reverse-payment settlement—patent
strength, patent law and policy, and risk aversion—they still suggest
that courts should reject these explanations under the Actavis
holding.164
Professor Cotter’s reading of Actavis goes even further.  By formu-
lating a flowchart for a rule-of-reason analysis, he argues that when
facing a reverse-payment settlement, a plaintiff will easily meet the
burden of proof, which will shift the burden to the defendant to prove
the payment’s procompetitive benefits.165  Despite the Court’s formal
adoption of the rule of reason, Cotter asserts that this framework func-
tions like a quick look or a de facto, presumptive illegality ap-
proach.166  To Professor Cotter, the potential risk to competition is
obvious in the reverse-payment settlement context.167  In addressing
why the Court adopted the rule of reason, Professor Cotter suggests
that the Court’s reasons were either political or based on concerns
that if the Court adopted a presumptive illegality standard, lower
courts would apply such a test in cases outside of the Hatch-Waxman
context.168
Some of these post-Actavis analyses seem to read the opinion as a
landslide victory for the FTC and other antitrust plaintiffs in reverse-
payment lawsuits.169  This reading may have gone too far.  First, to
160 See id. at 2238 (“We therefore leave to the lower courts the structuring of the pre-
sent rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”).
161 See Hovenkamp, supra note 110, at 3, 6. R
162 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236 (citing 12 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2046 (3d ed. 2010)).
163 See Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2237 (“[T]he likelihood of a reverse payment bringing
about anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor’s antic-
ipated future litigation costs, its independence from other services for which it might re-
present payment, and the lack of any other convincing justification.”); see also Hovenkamp,
supra note 110, at 25. R
164 See Edlin et al., supra note 27, at 18–20. R
165 See Cotter, supra note 28, at 43–46. R
166 See id. at 43, 46.
167 See id. at 45.
168 See id. at 47–48.
169 See, e.g., Alexandra Sklan, Supreme Court Rules in Favor of “Pay for Delay” Settlements, 2
PHARMACEUTICAL PAT. ANALYST 582, 583 (2013) (“FTC chairwoman, Edith [Ramirez], said
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read the Court’s opinion as a functional equivalent to presumptive
illegality ignores the Court’s clear rejection of presumptive illegal-
ity.170  Second, the de facto, presumptive illegality proposal also coun-
ters the Court’s holding that the anticompetitive effect of a settlement
depends on various factors, including the payment’s size, scale, inde-
pendence from other services, and lack of any other convincing justifi-
cation.171  Since the Court leaves the construction of the rule-of-
reason analysis to lower courts, it is likely that lower courts will require
plaintiffs to make a more rigorous economic showing beyond just the
size of the payment to satisfy the burden of proof.172
IV
PROPOSED MODEL TO ANALYZE REVERSE-PAYMENT
SETTLEMENTS
The Supreme Court’s holding in Actavis leaves the construction
of the rule-of-reason analysis to the lower courts.173  The Court also
leaves the door open to “other justifications” for reverse payments.174
By analyzing the issues left open by the Court, this Note proposes an
analytical model based on the Court’s holding and the aforemen-
tioned theories.  In agreement with the notion that a full scale rule-of-
reason analysis may not be necessary,175 this model draws from the
recent judicial development of antitrust analysis in tying arrange-
ments, especially the concurring opinion of four Justices in Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde.176  This framework requires a plaintiff
to demonstrate three factors to establish a prima facie case under the
rule of reason: (1) the patent holder has strong market power; (2) the
settlement amount or other considerations are not justified; and
(3) the potential enforceability of the patent is low.177  If a plaintiff
that the decision ‘is a significant victory for American consumers, American taxpayers, and free
markets.’”).
170 See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013) (explaining that “quick-look”
review is appropriate only when “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of
economics” could observe that “the arrangements in question would have . . . anticompeti-
tive effect[s]” (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
171 See id. at 2237; see also id. at 2236 (“An antitrust defendant may show in the antitrust
proceeding that legitimate justifications are present, thereby explaining the presence of
the challenged term and showing the lawfulness of that term under the rule of reason.”).
172 Joshua D. Wright, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Concur-
rences Journal Annual Dinner: FTC v. Actavis and the Future of Reverse Payment Cases
9–10 (Sept. 26, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pub
lic_statements/ftc-v.actavis-future-reverse-payment-cases/130926actavis.pdf.
173 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38.
174 See id. at 2236.
175 Hovenkamp, supra note 110, at 3, 6. R
176 See 466 U.S. 2, 32–47 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
177 See Hovenkamp, supra note 110, at 23. R
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establishes these threshold requirements, then the court can proceed
to weigh the procompetitive benefits of the reverse-payment settle-
ment against the anticompetitive harm.178
A. Reanalyzing the Issue After Actavis : A Comparison of Reverse-
Payment Settlements and Tying Cases
Actavis was not the first time the Supreme Court addressed the
tension between antitrust and patent law.179  But one important prin-
ciple in the Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis is to strike a balance
“between the lawful restraint on trade of the patent monopoly and the
illegal restraint prohibited broadly by the Sherman Act.”180
In analyzing its precedents, the Court concluded that “patent-re-
lated settlement agreements can sometimes violate the antitrust
laws.”181  However, Chief Justice Roberts forcefully opposed this rea-
soning in his dissent, claiming that the key word was “sometimes.”182
He argued that only when agreements relating to patents confer bene-
fits beyond the patent’s scope are those agreements subject to anti-
trust scrutiny.183  A close reading of the Supreme Court’s mixed
antitrust-patent cases seems to indicate that the Chief Justice was
right.184  Yet the majority in Actavis would extend antitrust scrutiny to
reverse-payment settlements even if the benefits of the settlements fall
within the scope of the patents,185 possibly because the Court was un-
certain about the enforceability of the patents.186
178 Id. at 23–24.
179 See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink., Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31–32 (2006) (con-
cerning a patent on special printer components); United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342
U.S. 371, 379 (1952) (“Price control through cross-licensing was barred as beyond the pat-
ent monopoly.”); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 315 (1948) (holding
that a patentee’s use of control in cross-licensing to fix prices is unlawful); Int’l Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (concerning a patent on salt processing machines).
180 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  The Court also considered other aspects such as the long-standing judicial objective
to settle lawsuits without wasting judicial resources, see id. at 2234 (“The Eleventh Circuit’s
conclusion finds some degree of support in a general legal policy favoring the settlement
of disputes.”), but it concluded that other antitrust considerations, taken together, out-
weigh the single desirability of settlement.
181 Id. at 2232.
182 Id. at 2242 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
183 See id.
184 See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 494 (1926) (holding that a
licensing agreement containing a restriction on sale price of the patented devices is a law-
ful exercise of the monopoly created by the patent).
185 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230 (“[W]e are willing to take this fact as evidence that the
[agreement] . . . fall[s] within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent. . . .
But we do not agree that that fact . . . can immunize the agreement from antitrust attack.”
(quoting FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc. 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
186 Although the language in Actavis seems to suggest that the Court is willing to ex-
tend antitrust scrutiny to agreements that fall within the exclusionary potential of the pat-
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Since the Court extended antitrust scrutiny to areas within a pat-
ent’s scope, it is helpful to look at the Court’s analytical framework for
issues that fall outside the patent’s scope.187  One particularly proba-
tive framework is the Court’s analysis in tying arrangements.
A common type of tying case involves a product that has been
tied to a patented product through licensing contracts.188  Of course,
tying products do not need to be patented, but for the purposes of
this Note, I will discuss cases that involve patented products.  In Illinois
Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., an unpatented ink product was
tied to a patented ink container designed for a printer.189  Wholesal-
ers agreed with the manufacturer not to use ink from other competi-
tors to fill the patented ink container.190
The Supreme Court had previously held that while a natural mo-
nopoly in the tying product is lawful, any attempt to extend monopoly
power to a tied market to extract greater profits, thus harming both
competition and consumers in the tied market, is anticompetitive and
unlawful.191  The Court had treated tying arrangements as per se
unlawful for years.192  However, realizing that tying schemes might
have some procompetitive effects, the Court later declined to apply a
strict per se rule and instead adopted a qualified per se rule.  Under
this new rule, tying arrangements are illegal per se if the plaintiff can
show that: (1) purchases of the tying product are conditioned upon
purchase of a distinct, tied product;193 (2) the seller possesses suffi-
cient market power in the tying market to compel acceptance of the
tied product;194 and (3) the arrangement forecloses a not-insubstan-
tial volume of commerce in the tied market.195  In Illinois Tool Works,
the Court announced that tying arrangements involving patented
products should also be evaluated under the same standard.196  The
ent, a close reading suggests that such extension is premised upon the uncertain
enforceability of the patent. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231 (“The patent here may or may
not be valid, and may or may not be infringed.”); see also id. at 2240 (Roberts, C.J. dissent-
ing) (“The problem, as the Court correctly recognizes, is that we’re not quite certain if the
patent is actually valid, or if the competitor is infringing it.”).
187 See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 77–78. R
188 Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 33 (2006).
189 Id.
190 Id. at 31–32.
191 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984) (“Our cases
have concluded that the essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the
seller’s exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer into the
purchase of a tied product . . . .”).
192 See Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947); see also Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305–06 (1949) (“Tying agreements serve hardly any purpose
beyond the suppression of competition.”).
193 Fortner Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 507 (1969).
194 Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611–13 (1953).
195 Fortner Enters., 394 U.S. at 499.
196 Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42 (2006).
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conclusion that an arrangement is unlawful “must be supported by
proof of power in the relevant market rather than by a mere presump-
tion thereof.”197
The analysis in these cases shifted almost from a per se rule to a
rule-of-reason analysis.198  In Jefferson Parish, five Justices in a sharply
divided Court upheld the qualified per se rule.199  However, four Jus-
tices issued a separate concurring opinion advocating a case-by-case
rule-of-reason application in tying arrangement cases.200  The concur-
ring Justices proposed three threshold conditions prior to a balancing
analysis: (1) market power in the tying product, (2) a substantial
threat of market power in the tied product, and (3) a coherent eco-
nomic basis for treating the products as distinct.201  If all three condi-
tions are satisfied, they argued, courts should then weigh the
economic benefits of the arrangement against its harms.202
The Court’s analysis of tying arrangements can shed light on the
treatment of reverse payments.  This analysis has migrated from a
strict application of the per se rule to a more relaxed one.203  Simi-
larly, on the reverse-payment settlement issue, the Supreme Court re-
jected the quick look analysis in favor of the rule-of-reason analysis, a
more relaxed approach.204  Although developed under different his-
torical settings, the schemes share many similarities.  For example,
both arrangements are anticompetitive when patent holders are trying
to extract benefits that are not conferred by the immunized scope of
the patent law.205  In tying cases, the anticompetitive harm comes
from the extension of monopoly power in one market to obtain con-
197 Id. at 42–43.
198 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984)
(“[T]here is often no bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason analysis. Per se rules
may require considerable inquiry into market conditions before the evidence justifies a
presumption of anticompetitive conduct.”); see also Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 35 (“Over the
years, however, this Court’s strong disapproval of tying arrangements has substantially di-
minished.”); cf. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984) (“It is far
too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that cer-
tain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore
are unreasonable ‘per se.’”); Meribeth Richardt, Tying Arrangement Analysis: A Continued Inte-
gration of the Rule of Reason and the Per Se Rule: Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v.
Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984), 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 337, 347–49 (1985) (“In Jefferson Parish
Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, the Supreme Court narrowed the distinction between per se
and rule of reason analysis of tying arrangements.”).
199 466 U.S. at 16–18.
200 466 U.S at 32–47 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
201 Id. at 41.
202 Id.
203 See supra discussion accompanying notes 198–202. R
204 See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2231, 2239 (2013).
205 Again, in tying arrangements, the tying products do not always need to be pat-
ented, but for the purpose of this section, I will focus on tying arrangements involving
patented products.  In tying cases, the patent scope analysis is closely related to the patent
misuse doctrine. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 40–41 (2006)
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trol of a second market.206  In reverse-payment settlements, parties
reach agreements to exclude potentially noninfringing products from
entering the market.207  Both arrangements can be anticompetitive if
one party has sufficient market power but may also be procompetitive
so that the traditional per se treatment (for tying arrangements) or
quick look treatment (for reverse payments) would not be
appropriate.208
Therefore, analogous to the Court’s reasoning regarding tying ar-
rangements, this Note posits that in reverse-payment settlement cases,
the party who is challenging a settlement must demonstrate the fol-
lowing to satisfy a prima facie case: (1) the patent holder has strong
market power; (2) the settlement amount or other considerations are
too large to be justified; and (3) the potential enforceability of the
patent is low.  If the antitrust plaintiff meets this burden, the court
should then conduct a balancing analysis to determine whether the
procompetitive effects of the settlement outweigh the anticompetitive
harm.
B. Analysis Under the Proposed Model
1. The Patent Holder’s Market Power
In a tying case, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant has mo-
nopoly power in the tying product market.209  Without market power,
whatever arrangement the seller makes with regard to the tied prod-
uct will likely not restrain competition in the tied product’s market.210
For example, if an item can be easily substituted, consumers will not
buy the tied product if they are forced to purchase the tying prod-
uct.211  To establish market power, antitrust analysis places emphasis
on key factors such as market concentration and the fungibility of the
product.212
(discussing the patent misuse treatment on tying arrangements); see also Ingle, supra note
59, at 538 (proposing a patent misuse treatment to the reverse payment). R
206 See supra discussion accompanying notes 191–97; see also Richardt, supra note 198, R
at 340–41 (“Tying arrangements fall within the antitrust laws because they extend the
seller’s power in the tying product’s market to the tied product’s market.” (footnote
omitted)).
207 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2226.
208 See Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 35–36; Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 112–13. R
209 See supra discussion accompanying note 194. R
210 See Opderbeck, supra note 26, at 1330–32. R
211 Id. at 1331.
212 See id. at 1329–32 (discussing the importance of assessing a product’s market con-
centration); Herbert Hovenkamp, Market Power in Aftermarkets: Antitrust Policy and the Kodak
Case, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1447, 1450 (1993) (“Market power is a matter of degree.  In per-
fectly competitive markets for fungible products, firms price at marginal cost and market
power is said not to exist.”).
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In cases involving a patent, the antitrust analysis should not be
different.  In Illinois Tool Works, the Supreme Court held that to prove
that a tying arrangement involving a patented product is unlawful, the
claim “must be supported by proof of power in the relevant market
rather than by a mere presumption thereof.”213  The Court ruled that
“a patent does not necessarily confer market power upon the paten-
tee.”214  Similarly, in Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s concurrence in
Jefferson Parish, she argued that while a patent product may help give a
seller market power, it is also possible that a seller will not have mar-
ket power if there are close substitutes for the patented product.215
“[A] high market share indicates market power only if the market is
properly defined to include all reasonable substitutes for the
product.”216
In Actavis, the Court seemed to indicate that the threshold for
proving market power would be a very low one, stating that “the ‘size
of the payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a prospective
generic is a strong indicator of power.’”217  However, the Court was
probably not proposing that this threshold created a presumption of
market power for at least two reasons.
First, the Court states that “where a reverse payment threatens to
work unjustified anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely possesses
the power to bring that harm about in practice.”218  In other words,
the plaintiff still has to prove that the anticompetitive harm, such as a
price above the competitive level, is unjustified.
Second, the Court says that the size of the payment is “a strong
indicator of power,” not the only indicator or a sufficient indicator.219
Thus, factors such as a brand-name drug company’s market share of
similar drugs or annual profits on these drugs can demonstrate a pat-
ented drug’s market power.220  Determining market power should not
cause substantial difficulties for courts, as a company’s public findings
provide a common way to examine a product’s market share and cor-
responding annual revenue.221
213 Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 42–43.
214 Id. at 45.
215 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 37 n.7 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
216 Id.
217 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (quoting 12 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2046 (3d ed. 2010)).
218 Id. (emphasis added).
219 Id.  (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
220 See Opderbeck, supra note 26, at 1329. R
221 See, e.g., id. at 1339 (explaining courts’ ability to calculate a product’s HHI measure-
ment); see also id. at 1344 n.275 (providing resources for obtaining sales figures and market
data).
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2. The Settlement Amount
In Actavis, the Court stated that a reverse payment “may amount
to no more than a rough approximation of the litigation expenses
saved through the settlement.”222  However, the Court also seemed to
accept other types of settlements, such as “compensation for other ser-
vices that [a] generic [company] has promised to perform,”223
delayed entry, but before the patent’s expiration, of the generic com-
pany into the market.224  This latter type of settlement benefits con-
sumers of the patented drug more quickly, as it cuts the patent
holder’s monopoly short.225  The Court did not clarify how to value
these types of settlements or how to assess the validity of such settle-
ments; however, to challenge the legality of these settlements, an anti-
trust plaintiff should nonetheless present evidence of the services’
market value226 or the generic manufacturer’s projected profits
before the patent expires.  The Court also did not mention how to
determine the value and legality of settlements that relate to nonex-
clusive licenses.227  However, based on the Court’s primary emphasis
on consumer welfare in the Actavis decision,228 it is likely that the par-
ties to any settlement that limits competition may need to justify the
settlement’s value to a court.
The Actavis decision also suggested that there could be other “jus-
tifications”229 for reverse-payment settlement amounts, as mere litiga-
tion costs are not always an accurate indicator of the settlement
amounts.230  For instance, one way of calculating the reverse-payment
settlement amount is by adding a generic company’s potential earn-
ings to the litigation cost.231  This approach would be rational for a
brand-name company to pursue because once a generic company en-
ters the market, the brand-name company’s losses may exceed the ge-
neric company’s earnings due to a decrease in drug prices.232
222 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
223 Id.; see also In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12–cv–995 (WHW),
2014 WL 282755, at *7–8 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014) (reading Actavis to apply only to “reverse
payments” of money).
224 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
225 This seems to be consistent with the Supreme Court’s emphasis on customer wel-
fare.  For a general discussion about customer welfare and total welfare, see Hovenkamp,
supra note 110, at 7–8. R
226 Id. at 17 (“[Courts] must defer to the parties’ reasonable, good faith assessments of
likely outcomes and risk.”).
227 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. R
228 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235 (“The patentee and the challenger gain; the con-
sumer loses.”).
229 Id. at 2236.
230 See supra Part III (discussing scholars’ various approaches to reverse-payment settle-
ments that include litigation costs and other considerations).
231 See Crane, Exit Payments, supra note 106, at 780–82. R
232 See Andersen, supra note 51, at 1059. R
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Therefore, in order to keep drug prices high and the generic com-
pany out of the market, a brand-name company is likely to pay more
than the generic company could earn.233  However, it is not clear
whether a court would accept a reverse-payment settlement amount
comprised of litigation costs plus potential earnings, as the generic
company’s delayed entry would harm consumers.
Another reverse-payment settlement amount that may be justified
to a court is the patent holder’s cost of losing the patent-infringement
suit against the generic company—determined by the lost profits of
the patent holder from competition with the generic company, plus
the patent holder’s expected litigation costs, plus any other explained
costs.234  This calculation, however, is inevitably tied to a brand-name
company’s risk averse nature.235  Under the current HWA framework,
the first generic company that files an ANDA has nothing to lose and
much to gain, whereas the brand-name company risks losing the mo-
nopoly benefits associated with its patent when it files the patent-in-
fringement suit against the generic company.236  Even if a brand-name
company in a reverse-payment settlement case pays an enormous
amount of money to a generic company, this decision is economically
rational as long as the settlement amount does not exceed the brand-
name company’s estimated loss after a patent-infringement trial.  The
Supreme Court recognized this concern but determined that a pay-
ment based on this concern alone, without other explanations, likely
seeks to prevent competition and is probably not justified.237
If lower courts allow these considerations in assessing whether a
settlement amount is reasonable, a brand-name company’s own esti-
mation of loss after a patent-infringement trial will determine an ap-
propriate settlement amount.238  This estimation indicates a brand-
name company’s own confidence in its patent’s validity, which sup-
ports the previous commentators’ argument that in a reverse-payment
settlement case, a patent’s validity rather than the settlement amount
should be the focus of the antitrust inquiry.239
233 See id.
234 See A Post-Actavis Approach to Reverse Payment Settlements, LAW360 (July 31, 2013, 3:00
PM), http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/library/publication/2013articles/7-
31-13_Law360.pdf.
235 See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 95–96. R
236 See id.
237 See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (“[B]e that as it may, the
payment (if otherwise unexplained) likely seeks to prevent the risk of competition”).
238 See Crane, Exit Payments, supra note 106, at 780–82. R
239 See Crane, Ease Over Accuracy, supra note 24, at 710–11. R
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3. Potential Enforceability of the Patent
Analyzing the enforceability of the patent will determine the pat-
ent’s scope, an important consideration when applying antitrust scru-
tiny to reverse-payment settlement agreements.240  In Actavis, the
Court stated that the reverse-payment settlement agreement’s “poten-
tial for genuine adverse effects on competition” is premised on the
hypothetical that, had the patent been invalidated or not infringed, a
large sum of revenues would have flowed to consumers in the form of
lower drug prices.241  However, since an antitrust challenge to a
reverse-payment settlement occurs after the patent litigation has set-
tled, there arises an issue of second-guessing whether the patent is
valid.  Thus, determining the patent’s validity during an antitrust chal-
lenge penalizes the brand-name drug company by having the brand-
name company litigate the validity of the patent in both proceed-
ings.242  The Court addressed this dilemma in Actavis and then quickly
disposed of it, stating: “it is normally not necessary to litigate patent
validity to answer the antirust question . . . [and] [a]n unexplained
large reverse payment itself would normally suggest that the patentee
has serious doubts about the patent’s survival.”243  Commentators read
this language to suggest that the patent holder cannot raise the pat-
ent’s validity as a defense in an antitrust suit, as the Court appears to
adopt a payment approach rather than a patent approach in assessing
the reverse-payment settlement amount.244
However, this interpretation seems to contradict the Supreme
Court’s own view that “patent and antitrust policies are both relevant
in determining the ‘scope of the patent monopoly’—and conse-
quently antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by a patent.”245
Moreover, as previously discussed, the anticompetitive effect of the
payment seems to be premised on the possible enforceability of the
patent.246
Therefore, I argue that to establish a prima facie case challenging
a reverse-payment settlement, an antitrust plaintiff should provide cer-
tain proof, other than the payment itself, to indicate that the likeli-
hood of the patent’s enforceability is low.  This proposal is consistent
with the Supreme Court’s holding that an antitrust action should be
administratively feasible with no need to litigate the patent-infringe-
240 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231 (“The paragraph IV litigation in this case put the
patent’s validity at issue, as well as its actual preclusive scope.”).
241 Id. at 2234 (quoting FTC v. Ind. Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
242 See Opderbeck, supra note 26, at 1322–23. R
243 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
244 Edlin et al., supra note 27, at 17–18. R
245 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231.
246 See supra discussion accompanying notes 240–42. R
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ment suit.247  Rather than the clear-and-convincing evidence standard
applied to validity in a patent-infringement case,248 courts should re-
quire a lower burden of proof for the plaintiff in order to minimize
the emphasis on the minitrial that determines patent-infringement is-
sues within the antitrust case.249  For example, courts can require
plaintiffs to prove that, more likely than not, the patent is not enforce-
able—by analyzing the history and records of the patent disputes, ob-
taining expert-witness testimony, or interpreting settlement amounts
and patterns.250  Courts may also apply the “sliding scale” test, lower-
ing the threshold for proving patent unenforceability if the reverse-
payment settlement amount is exceptionally large with few justifica-
tions for such an amount.251
4. Balancing the Procompetitive Effects with the Anticompetitive
Harm
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a defendant should
be allowed to provide procompetitive justifications while the court
conducts a balancing test to decide whether the reverse-payment set-
tlement passes antitrust scrutiny.
As the Actavis Court correctly points out, the HWA was not de-
signed to allow deals between brand-name and generic companies.252
Both patent holders and ANDA challengers may abuse this system by
colluding with one another to maintain exclusive power on weak pat-
ents,253 which will ultimately harm consumers through drug prices at
supracompetitive levels.254  The “genuine adverse effects on competi-
tion” exist because a reverse-payment settlement agreement in effect
“amounts to a purchase by the patentee of the exclusive right to sell its
product, a right it already claims but would lose if the patent litigation
were to continue and the patent were held invalid or not infringed by
the generic product.”255  In other words, consumers will “continually
be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or
justification.”256
247 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
248 See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011).  This higher
standard derives from a statutory presumption of validity that attaches to patents. See 35
U.S.C. § 282 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
249 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2226; Edlin et al., supra note 27, at 19. R
250 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329.
251 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38 (internal quotation marks omitted).
252 Id. at 2234.
253 See Andersen, supra note 51, at 1043. R
254 See Joshua P. Davis, Applying Litigation Economics to Patent Settlements: Why Reverse Pay-
ments Should Be Per Se Illegal, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 262 (2010).
255 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234 (internal quotation marks omitted).
256 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
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While reverse-payment settlements may have their shortcomings,
a short-term reduction in competition increases a patent’s value, pro-
vides more secure protection to a brand-name company, and allows a
brand-name drug company to recoup more capital for later research
and development.257  A reverse-payment settlement may also be an in-
centive for patent holders to be innovative and to file stronger pat-
ents,258 thereby creating procompetitive effects in the long term.259
Therefore, there is a consumer welfare trade-off between maintaining
the prices that consumers pay for existing products and stimulating
research and production of new products for future consumption.260
In addition, some empirical data seem to suggest that at least some-
times, reverse-payment settlements have very minimal or neutral im-
pact on competition.261  The reverse-payment settlement agreement
should be condemned only when its anticompetitive impact outweighs
its procompetitive benefits.262
C. Limitations
Realizing the complexity of the reverse-payment settlement issue
and the arguments from both antitrust law and patent law perspec-
tives, I propose this mechanism to formulating a rule-of-reason analy-
sis that can achieve balanced interests for both sides.
Perhaps the most contentious part of this proposal is the need for
an antitrust plaintiff to prove that a patent lacks enforceability.  It is
unclear if the Supreme Court in Actavis suggests that only antitrust law
should be utilized to analyze reverse-payment settlements.263  The
Court does state that “the size of the unexplained reverse payment
can provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all without
forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration of the validity of the
patent itself.”264  One way to read this opinion is that the enforceabil-
ity of a patent should count as one explanation for the size of a re-
257 James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Intellectual Property and Agreements to Settle Patent
Disputes: The Case of Settlement Agreements with Payments from Branded to Generic Drug Manufac-
turers, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 777, 778 (2003).
258 See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 90. R
259 Langenfeld & Li, supra note 257, at 778. R
260 Id.
261 See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 112–13 (empirical studies show that reverse R
payments are not necessarily anticompetitive).
262 For a similar proposition in tying analysis, see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 42 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“A tie-in should be condemned
only when its anticompetitive impact outweighs its contribution to efficiency.”).
263 Again, commentators vary on this issue, and Edlin et al. believe that the strength of
the patent is not a valid defense post-Actavis. See Edlin et al., supra note 27, at 19.  But FTC R
Commissioner Joshua Wright holds a different view. See Wright, supra note 172, at 15 (“[I]t R
would be surprising if courts summarily did away with the question of patent validity as part
of their analysis altogether.”).
264 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236–37 (2013).
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verse-payment settlement, of which anticompetitive effect should be
weighed against other, procompetitive effects, such as efficiency.265
Therefore, even if lower courts would not agree that a plaintiff should
be required to bear the burden of proof on the patent enforceability
issue, they should allow antitrust defendants to provide evidence that,
more likely than not, the size of the settlement is justified through the
patent’s enforceability.266
CONCLUSION
I propose a model for analyzing reverse-payment settlements in
the antitrust setting.  To strike a balance between patent law’s exclu-
sionary exemption and antitrust law’s prohibition on anticompetitive
agreements, I propose that antitrust plaintiffs bear the burden to
prove their prima facie case under the rule-of-reason analysis.  Three
factors need to be present to prove anticompetitive harm: (1) the pat-
ent holder must have strong market power; (2) the settlement amount
or other considerations must not be justified; and (3) the potential
enforceability of the patent must be low.  Only after a plaintiff estab-
lishes this prima facie case should a court conduct the more compli-
cated balancing analysis to weigh the procompetitive benefits of the
agreement against its anticompetitive harm.
265 See Wright, supra note 172, at 16. R
266 Id. at 15–16 (“What role patent validity will play within the rule-of-reason is an open
question . . . .  [O]ne possibility is that after a plaintiff satisfies its prima facie bur-
den[,] . . . the defendant will be able to put on evidence that the strength of its patent
justifies the size of the payment or the payment is otherwise not competitively suspect in
light of the strength of the patent.”).
